Sunshine Mine
Kellogg, Shoshone County, Idaho
May 22, 1972 -91 killed
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Each of these capsules had been designed to carry two men, and were brought to the mine because a man-capsule (or "torpedo" or man-cage) which was designed and built at the mine site turned out to be inadequate for the task, primarily because it did not provide an emergency escape hatch. In order not to divert men from the other rescue and recovery operations, the Bureau gathered 22 additional men from nearly all its Metal and Nonmetal Health and Safety districts throughout the country. Shortly after 9 o'clock at night on May 8, the first two-man crew was lowered into the No. 12 borehole in the AEC capsule that was finally selected as most suitable for the operation. They discovered that the borehole not only was irregular and rough but contained many slabs of loose rock which could endanger the lives of any men making the descent. Therefore, as they were being lowered, they began to scale loose rock. In the first hour, they progressed less than 150 feet of the total 1,I00-foot distance, and were hoisted because of extreme fatigue. Crew after crew then followed, scaling the loose and jagged rock. By 3 a.m. on May 9, the capsule had descended only 450 feet.
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After the crews reached a depth of 580 feet, conditions improved. The remaining 520 feet of the corkscrew-shaped borehole was in better condition, and the manned capsule was able to reach the 4800 level shortly after 7 a.m. A fresh crew with equipment was then lowered and by noontime began exploring the 4800 level for survivors. This crew searched the area around the bottom of the borehole and the drifts west of cars, and one victim had fallen between the locomotive and the rib. The 4200 level self-rescuer cabinet had been entered, but no self-rescuers were found with these victims. It was also observed that the self-rescuer boxes on 4600 level were empty. Also, it was evident that the persons on 5200 level had attempted to build a bulkhead with brattice cloth, and the drift walls west of the Alimak raise were seen coated with a tar-like substance.
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The last bodies, making a total of 91 victims, were removed from the mine at 3:40 a.m. on May 13. Sunshine mine officials on May 15, 1972, provided Bureau officials with an updated accounting of mine personnel caught up in the disaster. They said 173 employees were underground when the fire was discovered. Of this number, 80 persons escaped, two survived, and 91 perished. The figure of 80 persons who actually escaped differed from figures reported earlier by the company. The final figure was determined when it was confirmed that only 13 of a possible 33 mechanics, only five of a possible 17 electricians were underground at the time of the fire, and four other employees did not go underground during the day shift on May 2. The difficulties experienced earlier in providing a reliable count of the number of persons underground at the time of the fire stemmed from the check-in, check-out system at the mine.
On reporting for work, each mine worker normally picks up a cap lamp and battery specifically assigned to him. How- ever, additional cap lamps are at times sent underground to replace those whose batteries become exhausted. Shift bosses also keep on their person, mainly for payroll purposes, a tally of individuals on the job, but in this case, many of the shift bosses perished with their crews.
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Chronology of the Fire and Recovery Operations Trained rescue crews from other local mines had been at the mine since 2:30 p.m. One of these crews had been instrumental in making an early recovery of 5 bodies from the 3700 level drift near the No.5 shaft. Several other unsuccessful rescue attempts were made this first afternoon and evening. By early morning of May 3, as the scope of the disaster was beginning to be realized, additional help was being organized. Other persons from the U.S. Bureau of Mines, State Mine Inspector's Office, and the United Steelworkers Health and Safety Department began arriving on the scene. Several more unsuccessful recovery attempts were made on the morning of May 3. On the afternoon of May 3, six more bodies were recovered from the 3100 drift. The fresh air entering the mine through the Jewell Shaft was being monitored to insure that contaminated air was not being recirculated throughout the mine. Rubber inflatable bags were being used to construct temporary seals and bulkheads in drifts and raises along the airways. This enabled rescue crews to establish fresh air bases as they progressed further into the mine.
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Bulkheading and airtight seals were also being placed from the Silver Summit drift on the 3100 level. This gave two-way approach to the No. 10 hoist, which was essential for the recovery of the No. 10 shaft and lower working levels. Work was also being done at the surface exhaust ventilation fan to clear smoke and gases from the 3100 level and 3700 level. On May 7, rescue crews entering from the Silver Summit drift had counted, but did not recover at that time, 15 more bodies near the 3100 level No. 10 shaft station area. In the meantime, after much preparation and some minor setbacks, the U.S. Bureau of Mines had succeeded in readying a two man "capsule" to be lowered to the 4800 level via No. 12 borehole to search for possible survivors. These efforts led to the recovery of 2 men, Tom Wilkinson and Ronald Flory, who were found to be in good condition after being trapped for 8 days. They were brought to the surface on the afternoon of May 9. By early morning on May 10, 36 bodies had been recovered, 11 had been located but not recovered, 2 had been rescued, and 44 were left unaccounted for. Work was continued on activating the No. 10 hoist. The hoist became operational at about 3:00 p.m., May 10. The shaft signaling system was revamped and descent to the lower levels progressed one level at a time. By late afternoon, May 11, all bodies previously unaccounted for had been located. The last were removed from the mine on May 13.
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Investigation of Possible Causes of Fire Investigation of the cause and the origin of the fire has continued (on a periodic basis). In order to determine the probable cause of ignition, one must try to ascertain the location of ignition. The general opinion is that the fire originated in the 09 vein somewhere between the 3400 and the 3550 levels, presumably near the 09 crosscut on the 3400 level. It is believed that when sufficient heat and fire had burned through a wooden bulkhead on the 3400 level 09 drift causing the bulkhead to collapse, smoke and gases were then picked up by the exhaust ventilation system and recirculated down the 910 raise and other raises along this route to the 3700 level and through- out the general working areas of the mine.
It is believed that the collapse of this bulkhead caused a short circuit of the ventilation, thus allowing the exhaust air to become the main source of air movement in the intake or fresh air system. This was unknowingly perpetuated by the closing of the fire doors on the 3100 level and the 3700 level. As the two main exhaust fans situated on the 3400 level continued to operate throughout the time of the fIre and were not shut off until 3:00 p.m. on May 7, when a fire fighting crew shut the main power feeder off at the 3700 level substation. Oxygen and Acetylene Cutting and Welding The possibility of ignition resulting from the cutting of rock bolts with an acetylene oxygen cutting torch on the 3400 level may have been the indirect cause of starting the fire although it is very unlikely that the fire began at the exact place that the cutting was being done. The area where the cutting was being con- ducted was no less than 300 feet on the downwind side from the nearest timbered area, which was the 09 drift intersection reported to have been thoroughly wet down.
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